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ABSTRACT 
The problem of optimally assigning individuals to heterogeneous objects so that 
each individual is allocated at most one object (the assignment problem) has a long 
history. Algorithms· ·based ·on ·ordinal preferences have been developed and several 
auctions using monetary transfers have been proposed. The performance of two auction 
mechanisms to solve the assignment problem is examined in an experimental setting. 
One of the auctions is a sealed-bid variant of the Vickrey auction for homogeneous 
objects and the other auction is an extension of the English auction. The auctions are 
tested in two diverse competitive environments (high and low contention). The 
experimental results show that the English auction generates higher revenues and 
efficiencies than its sealed-bid counterpart especially if there is a high level of 
contention. However, the efficiency gains of the English auction are at the expense of 
consumers' surplus. Indeed, a random assignment creates greater consumers' surplus 
relative to either auction outcomes in the high contention environment. 
1. Introduction
'vVe consider the problem of allocating a fixed and heterogeneous set of goods, 
which we will generically call slots. This problem is presented from the point of view of 
a planner or institution designer, who wishes to implement a soci:i,l welfare maximum 
such that each demander is assigned at most one slot. The formulation supposes that 
the planner himself attaches no value to any assignment. 
This problem appears in a variety of settings; computer scheduling, the 
administration of office space, the assignment of students to dormitory rooms or 
courses, and the disbursement of social services. The problem encountered by the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory of allocating antenna time on NASA's Deep Space Network 
(DSN) to spacecraft outside the earth's orbit has motivated this project. The DSN 
problem is an example of the allocation of a set of services in fixed supply within a 
given time period to a group of agents, a scheduling problem. In its most abstract and 
generic form the scheduling problem can be modeled as an assignment or one-sided 
matching problem. 
In the assignment problem, if the planner knows the values agents place on slots 
then an optimal assignment of agents to slots can be found by solving an integer 
programming problem. However, true values are known only to the agents so that any 
mechanism, which the planner uses, must work with revealed rather than true 
valuations. Several auction processes (Barr and Shaftel ( 1976); Leonard (1983); 
Demange et al. (1986)) have been proposed to solve the coordination and incentive 
issues posed by the assignment problem when the planner is allowed to use monetary 
transfers.1
To date, there is very little empirical evidence on the ability of such auctions to 
solve the assignment problem. Much evidence exists for single-unit and multiple-unit 
versions of the Vickrey and English Auctions for homogeneous goods (see Cox et al.
( 1982), McCabe et al. ( 1990) and Coppinger et al. (1980)) .  However, when the goods to 
be allocated are heterogeneous,  the only evidence available is that of Rassenti et al. 
(1982), who present a combinatorial version of a "Vickrey" auction to allocate goods 
with severe complementarities (e.g. airline landing slots) and Banks et al. ( 1989) , who
use an English auction for multi-dimensional bundles of services (e.g. weight and
volume in the Space Shuttle) . One purpose of this paper is to provide some
experimental evidence on the performance of a sealed-bid auction and a variant of the 
1 Olson (199la) and a companion piece to this study (Olson and Porter (1991)) contain discussions of the 
assignment problem when the planner is not allowed to use transfers. 
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English auction to solve the standard assignment problem. 
In Section 2 we formally define the assignment problem. In Section 3 two 
proposed auctions to solve the assignment problem are described. In Section 4 the 
experimental design is presented. Section 5 provides a detailed description of the 
mechanisms tested and their implementation. In Section 6 we present the experimental 
results. Section 7 contains a summary and some concluding remarks. 
2. Formal Description of the Problem
In this section, we describe the classic assignment problem as a planner's prob­
lem. It is assumed throughout that the planner's goal is to maximize the total welfare 
of the system by assigning a set of slots to a group of agents. Each agent attempts to 
maximize utility (acquire their most valued slot) . Since several agents may place their 
highest value on the same slots, the planner must know the relative value of the slots to 
each agent. However, depending on the mechanism used, it may be in the agent's best 
interest to overstate or understate relative preferences for slots. 
The environment consists of n agents and k slots to be allocated. Let 
N = {1, . . .  ,n} index the set of agents, and let J( = {1, ... , k} index the set of slots. It
is assumed that both N and J( are finite and nonempty. Let .A be the set of 
feasible deterministic, allocations of J( to N, including the zero allocation, wherein no 
agent receives a slot. An element in .A is an n x k matrix consisting of at most a single 
1 in each row and column, where a,1=1, if agent i is assigned slot j, and a;1 = 0, if
he is not. We also define a'= (a;1, . . .  ,a;k) ·
The payoff of each agent depends upon the slot allocated, any monetary 
payment, and the agent's type. An agent's type parameterizes the value he places on 
the goods being allocated. Let G' c �k be a set of possible types for agent i, Vi E N.
Let GN =: X 8;. A g E GN will be called a profile. The number of agents and slots is
•EN 
fixed, so the feasible set is independent of the profile. Each agent i, evaluates each 
assignment x E .A (or assignment) through a valuation function v( x, B') = I: 1x;1B�. The
quantity v(x, 8') represents the willingness to pay of agent i of type e; for assignment x. 
The utility of agent i is quasi-linear and is given by U(x, t, gi) = v(x, Bi) + ti, where ti
is any monetary transfer to (or from) agent i.
We note that in the above definition agents may be indifferent between distinct 
assignments since they are selfish; that is, they care only about the slots allocated to 
them. vVhen the outcome space is .A, and agents are selfish, there is no loss of 
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generality in the linear description of utility, smce there are a finite number of slots. 
That is, when the outcome space is .A, given any utility function U( x ), there is a Bi such
that U(x, Bi)= L; jxijB� = U(x). The planner's objective is to assign the agents in N to
the slots in J{ such that total system welfare is maximized. We can describe this 
problem as follows: 
Given a profile BE 0N , Max W = L L B�xii ; (A) xE.A. iENjEK 
such that Al)  I: X;j::; 1, Vi E N;
jEK 
A2) I: X;j::; 1, v j E K;
i EN 
A3) X;jE {0,1}, Vi E N, VjE K. 
Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) were the first to consider this problem in an 
economic context. They showed that there always exists a solution to the problem but 
that it is not necessarily unique, that there always exists a competitive equilibrium set 
of prices {pj 2': O} j E K, which may not be unique. A further observation concerned
the additive invariance of the parameter fJi. That is, if a positive constant is added to
every element in the vector Bi, then the solution remains the same. If an allocation
solves (A), then we say that it is outcome efficient, and we call vV the total (or social) 
welfare of the system. 
3. Description of Allocation Mechanisms
Given the environment described above, several mechanisms are available to 
implement the outcome-efficient allocation in weakly dominant strategies. These mech­
anisms are multi-object generalizations of the "second-price" auction first described by 
Vickrey (1961). In these mechanisms the allocation is outcome-efficient and the prices 
paid by each agent are the minimum competitive equilibrium prices. vVe shall call 
these the Vickrey prices. 
Leonard (1983) proposed a sealed-bid auction to obtain the optimal allocation 
and Vickrey prices, which we shall call the Vickrey-Leonard auction. The Vickrey­
Leonard auction requires each participant to submit a sealed bid listing his valuation of 
each of the slots. The planner then determines the allocation by solving the assignment 
problem (A) using each participant's submitted bids in place of true valuations. There 
5 
are two equivalent methods to find the prices that the agents pay in this auction. One 
way is to compute the impact of a second slot of similar type. This entails the solution 
of k additional assignment problems. 2 A computationally simpler solution is to find 
the minimum dual prices .3 Given a profile e = (B1, ... , en), prices are determined by
solving the dual program: 
MinPj 
such that 
w-+p > e� • J-
LP;+ Lwi=WjEK iEN 
'llj EK, 'Iii EN
W;,P;::::: 0, 'llj E ]{,'Iii EN, 
where w; are slack variables.
(A') 
Leonard (1983) and Demange and Gale (1985) have shown that it is a dominant 
strategy for agents to reveal their true valuations in this auction. However, in some 
environments truthful revelation is not a strong dominant strategy, in the sense that 
there may be many bids which generate the same assignment for an agent, a fact that 
we make precise in the following theorem. One of the environments (n = k = 6) we
investigate satisfies the conditions for a weakly dominant strategies, while the other 
environment ( n = 8 > k = 6) does not satisfy these conditions when agents are allowed
to bid on only k slots. 
Theorem 1: For the Vickrey-Leonard auction, when n::::; k the strategy b} = e; + c,
c E 3r is weakly dominant, i.e., revelation up to a constant.
proof. Recall that the optimal solution to the assignment problem does not change 
when a constant is added to any row of the valuation matrix (see, e.g., Koopmans and 
Beckman (1957)) as long as n = k (for the case n < k we can use imaginary bidders who 
,.. •* •* 
always bid zero). That is, suppose for some fixed i* EN, Bj = Bj + c, 'II j EK; then
'Li r; /i�x;; = r;; r; ;B}xij + c. The (xi;) that maximizes 'Li I: ;Bjx;; also ma.,'Cimizes
('Li r; ;B�xij + c ). So two vectors of bids that differ by a constant will assign an agent
2 Prices can be computed directly by setting p j .= (W� + j - w-JS-), where w-JS- :; largest sum of bids on 
slots I< = {1, ... , k} assigned to agents in N, and w'fS -r 3 ; maximum of the sum of bids on slots J( U {j} to agents
in .iV; that is, add another slot j and solve the assignment program and obtain VV� + i. This is how the price
calculation was described to the subjects--see Appendix B for instructions. 
3 A similar approach was used by Rassenti. Smith, and Bulfin (1982). 
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to the same slot, and smce the price an agent pays 1s independent of his reported 
valuations, the price he pays is the same price when his bids differ by a constant. Since 
the allocation and the price of the slot are the same when an agei::t's bids differ by only 
a constant, he is indifferent between submitting the two bids. D.
Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986), hereafter DGS, proposed two variations of 
an English auction to obtain the Vickrey prices.4 When there is only one slot to 
allocate, an English clock auction is conducted by first setting an arbitrarily low asking 
price for the slot; each bidder then announces whether he wants the slot at the 
announced price. If only one bidder demands the slot, he is awarded it at the 
announced price and the auction ends. If more than one bidder demands the slot, the 
price is increased by a fixed amount. The auction continues by increasing the price 
until only one bidder demands the slot. When a set of heterogeneous slots are to be 
allocated the pricing algorithm becomes more complicated. 
DGS developed an "exact" and an "approximate" auction where bids are 
requests to buy slots at the announced price. The two variations differ in the procedure 
used to determine which slots will have their prices increased in the next step. vVe only 
examine the approximate auction case in this paper. The DGS auction begins with the 
planner announcing a set of prices, one for each slot. Each agent submits a request to 
purchase the slot at the announced price; selecting more than one slot implies that the 
agent is indifferent among the slots selected for assignment. Slots that are contained in 
the largest, pure-overdemanded set have their prices increased.5 A set of slot is 
overdemanded if the number of bidders demanding only slots in this set is greater than 
the number of slots in the set. The largest pure-overdemanded set contains all over­
demanded sets. The auction ends when there are no overdemanded slots. 
DGS rely on the implicit assumption that agents will act honestly,6 that is, 
request only those slots that maximize value minus current price. This assumption 
requires a bidder whose maximum net value is zero to place bids on all slots that have a 
net value of zero, if he places a bid on any such slot. In particular, when k < n this 
requires the existence of null items with a value and price of zero. If this assumption is
4 Barr and Shaftel (1976) propose a generalization of a second-price descending-bid auction to obtain the 
Vickrey prices; it is discussed in detail in Olson (1991b). 
5 This variation is due to Mo (1988). 
6 A bid BC K is honest i 'r/ IE B, v1 - Pz;:;;; ;max ( v j - p j) and if l E J( / B, v1 - Pz <.max ( v j - p j); if 
\fj E J( (v1. - p ·) < 0, then B = 0 and t agent does notJstJ.ikit a bid, where p .  is the price of itJmE J� and v .  is the J J J 
value of slot j to the bidder. 
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met, then the outcome-efficient allocation and Vickrey prices will be obtained in the 
DGS auction. However, for the DGS auction process, honesty is not a dominant 
strategy. (Olson ( 1 99lb) provides an example) but it is a Nash equilibrium. 
Theorem 2: In the DGS exact auction, it is a Nash equilibrium for each agent to select 
the slot(s) that maximize utility at each price announcement (truthful revelation); 
i. e., given (pi, ... ,p0, agent i selects the slots l EK, such that (Bi- pl)= max{Bj- p�},. t J and (Bl- P1) 2:: 0.
Before we supply the proof, some notation and behavior implied by honest 
bidding is provided. At each iteration t given prices pt, an agent places a bid b' � K,
which is a selection of slots. At iteration t + 1, b� + 1 � b' is the set of slots that the
agent bids for at iteration t that had a price increase at iteration t + 1 .  At iteration
t + 1 ,  b� + 1 � b' is the set of slots that the agent bid for at iteration t that did not have
a price increase at iteration t + 1. Thus:
1 .  If b' = 0 at t, then b' + 1 = 0 at t + 1 .  If an agent does not bid for a slot at
iteration t, she will not bid for a slot at iteration t + 1.
2. If b' � ]{ at t and b� + 1 = b', then either b' + 1 = b' U b, or b' + 1 = 0, where
b � K\b' U 0. If an agent bids for a set of slots at iteration t and each slot has a price
increase at iteration t + 1, then either the agent will bid on the same slots and possibly
an additional slot, or will not bid on any slot. 
3. If b' � [{at t and b�+i Cb' (a proper subset), then b1+1 = b�+1. If the price
increases on some of the slots that the agent has bid for at iteration t, then he will drop
his bids on those slots and keep his bids on the slots that did not have an increase in 
pnce. 
We now provide the proof: 
proof: In the DGS auction, if all agents are honest, then the vector of prices p• that
results from the auction is the vector of minimum core prices (or competitive 
equilibrium; see DGS). By definition of the core, an agent cannot increase his net value 
in any slot other than the slot assigned to him. So once the equilibrium prices are 
reached, there is no advantage for an agent to be dishonest . If p' 2:: p• and all agents
are honest, the auction stops; if an agent is not honest, the auction will stop and he will 
be no better off at another slot. If the auction does not stop, then there will be a price 
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increase on some slot, and the agent cannot be made better off, since pe gives him his
highest net value. 
Also, by definition of the core, if pj < pj at some iteration t and some slot j
there will be overdemanded slots. If all agents are honest, prices will increase at t + 1 .
So  an auction will end with pj < pj only if an agent i s  dishonest . But that would
imply removing a bid from slot j or adding a bid to another slot. In either case the 
agent is worse off if the auction stops (since bidding on his highest net-valued slot is the 
honest bid). D. 
An agent cannot directly make himself better off by being dishonest; only if 
other agents bid dishonestly is it possible to be made better off by a dishonest bid. We 
note that honesty is not a weakly dominant strategy in our environment, and that there 
are many Nash equilibria that do not correspond to the social optimum. 
Theoretically, both auctions yield the same assignment (outcome-efficient assign­
ment and Vickrey prices), assuming that bidders act honestly. In the experimental 
literature there has been much success with the use of progressive (English) auctions in 
obtaining efficient allocations, especially relative to their sealed-bid counterparts 
(examples of this literature are Banks et al. (1989) and McCabe et al. ( 1990) ). The 
ability of the English auction to provide feedback to participants concerning where they 
stand and how to improve their current standing appears helpful. 
4. Experimental Design
The experimental design consists of two fixed factors: type of mechanism (sealed­
bid (Vickrey-Leonard) and progressive (DGS) auctions), and parameter set (high and 
low contention). We begin by discussing the parameters of the environment and then 
describe the payment conditions. We end this section with a summary list of the 
experiments we have conducted. 
4.1. Parameters of the Environment 
The environment under consideration consists of 6 slots, J{ = {1, 2, . . . , 6}, which 
must be allocated to a set of six or eight subjects. Preferences over slots are induced 
using monetary payoffs for each slot provided to each subject (see Smith (1 976)). Each 
participant could be assigned one of 10 possible payoff sheets or types. An abbreviated 
list of payoffs is provided below in Table 1 (the complete listing of the payoffs used in 
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our experiment can be found in Appendix A). For example, given the payoff list in 
Table 1 ,  if a subject were provided with sheet 2 and assigned item 3, he would obtain a 
value of 800. At the beginning of each period each subject is assigned a payoff sheet 
that is drawn uniformly from the set with replacement, i.e., the" fact that priors over 
types are uniform was given as common information to the subjects. 
Payoff Sheet 
Num her 
1 
2 
10 
1 
800 
400 
300 
Table 1: 
An Example of a Payoff List
Item Number 
2 3 4 5 6 
600 400 200 400 600 
600 800 600 400 200 
300 300 300 300 900 
Given the payoff tables and number of subjects, we can solve for the optimal 
assignments and the set of competitive equilibrium prices (the core). Let Pi denote the
Vickrey prices (minimal dual prices in the core) determined from (A'). If vj is the
value of slot j from the optimal assignment determined in (A), then the closer Pi is to
vj, the higher is the level of competition for the slot (more of the buyers' surplus is
transferred to the planner) .  Competition for a slot is a function of both the profile and 
the number of agents wanting a slot allocation. In our experiments we created two 
alternative competitive environments based on the following ratio we call the contention 
index (C): 
C _ [ °£;Pi - L W* ' 
where j indexes the slot, pi is its Vickrey price, vV* is the outcome-efficient welfare for 
a profile of payoff sheets from the payoff list, and [L is the expectation operator defined 
over the possible profiles from a given payoff'list. Notice that CE [0,1]. A realization 
of C = 1 implies that all the surplus in the system is paid out at the "competitive" 
equilibrium prices, and a realization of C = 0 implies that the profiles are diverse and all 
the surplus is retained by the subjects. 
Varying C in the experiments provides us with a check on the robustness of 
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potential allocation mechanisms, so that we may explore the hypothesis that the surplus 
and efficiency of the tested mechanisms are sensitive to the expected contention. For 
our experiments two environments are considered: one with a "low-contention index" 
and one with "high-contention index." The low-contention environment utilizes six 
subjects and six slots, with values that, on average, provide contention for only one or 
two of the slots. In the high-contention environment, there are six slots and eight 
subjects and the values were such that almost all slots would have a high-contention 
index. Figure 1 in Appendix A supplies a graph of the actual realization of contention 
levels used for the low-contention and high-contention treatments. The individual 
draws and associated core prices for each slot for the experiments we conducted can be 
found in Appendix A. 
Table 2 shows our 2x2 design. The number of experiments for each cell is listed. 
A summary list of each experiment is provided in Table 3. All of our experiments were 
conducted at the California Institute of Technology using graduate and undergraduate 
subjects. Each experimental session consisted of 20 periods where at the beginning of 
each period, each subject was given a payoff sheet. All communication was done 
through computer terminals, and a history of prices and personal selections was 
provided by the software so that subjects could review past periods. Each experimental 
session consisted of only one allocation mechanism and one set of payoff parameters 
(high-contention or low-contention parameters). A partial set of subject instructions 
can be found in Appendix B. 
Table 2 
2x2 Design Factors 
(numbers in cells are the number of experiments conducted) 
Mechanism Environment Parameters 
Low contention High Contention 
Vickrey-Leonard 3 2 
DGS-Progressive 2 2 
Given the environment defined above, the planner's objective is to design 
allocation mechanisms to assign slots to subjects, which result in the maximum social 
welfare. We consider this design question next. 
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5. Implementation of the Allocation Mechanisms Tested
In the VL auction subjects submitted a sealed bid for each of the six slots to be 
allocated (if no bid was entered for an item, it was assumed to be 0). Each subject's bid 
consisted of a vector of monetary bids (bj, ... , bi) over the slots with the restriction that
bj E [O, 9999], \;/ j E K. The allocation is determined by solving the integer program
described in (A),  replacing B} with b� (using bidder's submitted bids in place of their
valuations) . 7 The prices were determined by solving the dual program. Once the 
allocation and prices were determined, they were transmitted to the subjects, profits 
were then calculated and histories updated, after which a new period was started. 
Implementation of the DGS auction was more involved. The process proceeded 
as follows: First, at the beginning of a period (iteration t = 0) initial prices were set at 
zero for each slot. Given these prices individuals selected the slots they would like at 
those prices. Given the selections, an algorithm determined which slots were 
overdemanded. 8 If a slot was overdemanded, its price would increase for the next 
iteration and the period would continue with the updated prices. For each 
overdemanded slot its price at the next iteration was increased by 50 francs. 9 The 
process stopped when there were no overdemanded slots; an assignment was then 
made. Those assigned to the slots paid the current price, except in an instance that is 
described below. 
To implement the DGS auction process, we imposed two additional rules that 
were based on our experience with the DGS pilot experiment and with single-object 
English auctions. First, we imposed a commitment rule. If a subject selected a slot at 
an iteration and the slot was not overdemanded, then he was committed to select that 
slot at the next iteration (i.e., subjects could not renege on selections if the price of 
those selections did not increase). Second, the auction does not elicit bids when a 
subject's maximum net value is zero, thus we used a back-tracking rule: if at the end of 
a period a slot is unassigned, then the slot is randomly allocated among the last 
unassigned bidders who placed a bid on the slot at a previous iteration. 
7 If there were ties in the bids to determine allocations, they were broken randomly. If a slot was not 
demanded in the auction, it was assigned randomly to those who were not previously assigned a slot. 
8 The algorithm is a variation of the Ford-Fulkerson procedure (see, e.g., Franklin (1980) and Gale (1960)).
9 In a pilot we tried increments of 10 and 25 francs but found that 20 periods could not be completed in a 
reasonable amount of time (less than 2 hours) . 
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Table 3 lists the experiments we have conducted along with pertinent infor-
mation about each session. 
Table 3. Experiment History 
name # contention payoff time 
VLl 1 high $15.80 1.6hr 
VL2 2 low $15.20 1.2hr 
VL3 3 high $14.20 1.5hr 
VL4 4 low $15.00 1.lhr
DGSl 5 low $18.70 lhr 
DGS2 6 low $18.00 50min 
DGS3 7 high $15.40 1.5hr 
DGS4 8 high $16.00 1.5hr 
VL5 9 low $15.20 55min 
Notes: 
All experiments had 6 slots and 20 periods. High-contention experiments had 8 subjects; low­
contention experiments had 6 subjects. The name describes the type of experiment: VL = Vickrey­
Leonard sealed-bidi DGS = Demange et al., progressive auction. 
We also ran 2 pilot VL sealed-bid auctions (1 low-contention and 1 high-contention) and one 
pilot DGS auction (high-contention). 
6. Experimental Results 
For each mechanism and environment, we measure two aspects of performance: 
efficiency and consumer surplus. Efficiency measures overall performance relative to 
the optimal allocation (as defined by (A)); that is, it measures the ability of the mech­
anism to maximize total welfare. Consumer surplus measures the distribution of system 
surplus to the subjects. These measurements are normalized by the outcome-efficient 
allocation and the Vickrey prices. We also measure the revenue generated from each 
auction and individual choice behavior. 
6.1 Efficiency
Efficiency is measured as the total observed welfare divided by the total welfare 
that would have been realized if the optimal allocation had been implemented. That is, 
for each period, 
E = ( "£ ;,;x;;V;;)/( "£ ;,;xi;v;;),
where (xi;) is the optimal allocation, and X;; is the allocation that was actually realized.
We divide by the total welfare in order to normalize the data of each trial so that we 
can compare relative efficiencies across trials. Notice that if the allocation (x;;) is
outcome efficient then E = 1. 
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In Table 4a we display the average efficiencies and standard deviations achieved 
with the Vickrey-Leonard auction and the DGS auction for low and high contention. 
The table includes the expected efficiency from assigning slots randomly to subjects 
with the restriction that every slot is assigned. Efficiencies are averaged using three 
different restrictions on an experiment session: (all periods, the first ten periods, and 
the last ten periods of a session) to see if "learning has occurred." 10 The time series of 
efficiencies for each mechanism can be found in appendix C . 
. .TableAa: Mean.Efficiencies 
(observed relative to predicted VL assignment) 
Low Contention 
Vickrey-Leonard 
DGS Auction 
Random 
High Contention 
Vickrey-Leonard 
DGS Auction 
Random 
Periods 
All (v) 
0.97 (0.04) 
0.95 (0.11 )  
0.75 (0.10) 
0.95 (0.07) 
0.99 (0.03) 
0.62 (0.08) 
FirstlO (v) 
0.97 (0.04) 
0.92 (0.15) 
0.75 (0. 10) 
0.94 (0.08) 
0.99 (0.04) 
0.61 (0.08) 
From Table 4a we can make a number of observations: 
LastlO (v) 
0.97 (0.04) 
0 .98 (0.03) 
0.76 (0.09) 
0.97 (0.04) 
0.99 (0.03) 
0.62 (0.08) 
1. Both the VL and DGS auctions yield higher efficiencies than the expected
random assignment. 
2. In the low-contention DGS and high-contention VL, the efficiencies for the
first 10  periods are lower than the efficiencies for the last ten periods and the variances 
are higher in the first ten periods than in the last ten periods. 
3. In the .high-contention DGS. and low-contention VL there does not appear to
be any difference in the first and last ten periods. 
4. Except for the first periods of the low-contention DGS and high-contention VL
lO We will discuss the issue of learning in the section on indi vidual beha vior. 
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treatment, all the observations are close to predicted efficiency of 1.0. 
5. Except in the first ten periods of the low-contention DGS treatment, mean
efficiency of DGS is greater than VL. 
To determine if the difference m efficiencies is significant we estimate the 
following model: 
Yep= /30 + f31m + /32 f(p) + /33cm p +cm ho+ flm + /2 f(p) + /3Cm p) + /3.J( e) + €ep'e e e e e 
where: 
p =period number, p E {l, . . .  , 20}; e =experiment index.
I(e) =Indicator of experiment.
me= mechanism used in experiment e, me E {VL, DGS}.
Yep = (y��' y��); y:� =efficiency of experiment e in period p,
y�� = consumer surplus of experiment e in period p.
f (p) = a monotonic function of the period, in the following estimation we used:
f(p) = 1/ p. 
cm P = contention of mechanism me in period p.e 
/30 = constant. 
/31m =indicates mechanism effect.e 
(32, (33 _ coefficients of period variate and contention, respectively. 
cm = 1 if contention is high and 0 if contention is low.e 
/o, /im , /2, /3 change due to high contention.e 
/3 e = indicates experiment effect. 
€ep = ( €��' €��) - error term; and we assume the are independent and 
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Table 4b: Efficiencies11 
-------- All periods --------- -------- Last ten periods ---------
Variable Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value 
Constant 0 .9850 0 .0000 1 0 .9683 0 .0000 
Pl -0 .0803 0 .  0044t 0 .0920 0 .8393 
Contention 0 .0290 0 .6 180 0 .0222 0 .6808 
DGS -0.0130 0 .462 1 0 .0275 0.5113 
DGS*Pl 0 .0 829 0.0230 1 -.3813 0 .510 8  
COl 0 .0236 0 .7229 0 .0046 0 .9 50 5
P1*C01 -0 .00 54 0 .8874 0 .3024 0 .6050 
Cont*COl -0 .0 720 0 .4690 0 .0079 0 .9319 
DGS*COl 0 .02 45 0 .286 7 0 .0 10 8  0 .6263 
VLl(high) -0 . 0 119 0 .46 54 -.022 4 0 .1 563 
VL2(1ow) -0 .00 18 0 .9 126 -.0 172 0 .2 76 1
VL3(low) -0 .0046 0 .776 8  0 .0014 0 .9306 
DGSl(low) 0 .0098 0.5821 0 .0008 0 .9 586 
DGS3(high) 0 .  0011 0 .9 482 -.0 187 0.2359 
DGSl (per ::::; 5) -0 .2685 o .oooot na na 
Variables: Main effects:: Pl=l/period, DGS=J(DGS auction), COl=l(high contention), 
Cont=Contention index. VLl, VL2, VL3, DGSl, DGS3 are experimental indicators with their 
contention in parenthesis. Interaction effects are denoted by the symbol *· DGSl(per ::S 5) indicates 
the first 5 pefiods of experiment DGSl, in which the subjects had difficulty during the first 5 periods. 
The symbol indicates a probability level :S: 0.10; these variables will be considered significant in the 
discussions below. 
The estimation indicates: 
1. When all periods are included there is a significant period effect; when only
the last ten periods are included there are no significant effects. This would indicate 
that there is no difference in the efficiencies generated by the DGS and VL auctions. 
2. The Vickrey-Leonard and DGS auctions result in efficiencies close to the
theoretical prediction. 
3. The significant positive coefficient for DGS•Pl indicates that there 1s a
greater increase of efficiency over periods for the DGS treatment. 
11 The effects on efficiency and consumer surplus were measured simultaneously and we present them in full 
in Appendix D. The results for consumer surplus are presented in the next section. 
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6.2 Consumers' Surplus, Prices and Revenue
We measure relative consumers' surplus as the sum of the surplus realized by all 
subjects divided by the sum of the surplus that would have been realized if the optimal 
allocation and the Vickrey prices had been implemented. That is: 
S = ("'5:,i,Fijvij- L-jPj)/(L;,jxijvij- LjPj),
where (xij) is the optimal allocation and pj are the Vickrey prices, and X;j is the allo­
cation and p j are the prices that are actually realized. These are listed in Table 5a 
below. The time series of consumer surplus for each mechanism can be found in 
appendix C. 
Table 5a: Mean ConsUIUers' Surplus 
(observed relative to predicted VL assignment)
Periods 
Low Contention 
Vickrey-Leonard 
DGS Auction 
Random 
High Contention 
Vickrey-Leonard 
DGS Auction 
Random 
All (a-) 
1.01 (0.10) 
0.88 (0.16) 
0.88 (0.01) 
1.46 (0.97) 
1.03 (0.61) 
3.09 (0.58) 
From Table 5a we observe that: 
FirstlO (a-) 
1.01 (0.11) 
0.83 (0.20) 
0.89 (0.01) 
1.53 (1.15) 
0.89 (0.18) 
3.03 (0.56) 
LastlO (o-) 
1.01 (0.09) 
0.92 (0.10) 
0.88 (0.01) 
1.39 (0.75) 
1.18 (0.84) 
3.15 (0.60) 
1. The DGS auction did not result in consumer surplus that is much different
from from the random allocation in the low contention environment. The random 
allocation results in much higher consumer surplus in the high contention environment. 
2. Except for the the low-contention VL, there appears to be a difference in the
first and last ten periods. 
3. Only the consumer surplus in the low-contention VL treatment appears to be
consistently (both first and last periods) close to the predicted consumer surplus of 1.0.
4. In both the high-contention and low-contention treatment, the VL gives higher
11 
relative consumers' surplus than the DGS. Note that the only way that relative 
consumers' surplus can be over 1 is for participants to under-reveal. 
To determine if the difference in consumers' surplus is significant, we estimate 
the same model as for efficiency except that: 
Yep= relative consumers' surplus of experiment e and period p.
Table 5b: Consumers' Surplus 
-------- All periods --------- -------- Last ten periods ---------
Variable Coef. P-Value Coef. P-Value 
Constant 0.9612 0.0000 0.8398 0.0638 
Pl -0.0514 0.8556 1. 5531 0.8070 
Contention 0.3319 0.5746 0.4139 0.5847 
DGS -0.0859 0.6306 0.3290 0.5746 
DGS*P1 -0.1244 0.7438 -6.1225 0 .4513 
C01 -1. 2655 0. 0625t -0.9757 0.3462 
PhC01 0 .1285 0.7382 -0. 5533 0.9461 
Cont*C01 2.0964 o.039ot 1.8228 0.1612 
DGS*C01 -0.5123 o.0292t -0.4810 0 .1246 
VL1(high) -0.2515 0 .1288 -0.5455 o.0147t
VL2(low) 0.0352 0.8311 0.0417 0.8497 
VL3(low) 0.0085 0.9589 0.0233 0.9156 
DGS1(low) 0.0265 0.8840 0.0284 0.8973 
DGS3(high) 0.1356 0.4116 0.1420 0.5192 
DGS1 (per::; 5) -0.1669 0.5803 na na 
Variables: Main effects:: Pl=l/period, DGS=l(DGS auction), COl=l(high contention), 
Cont=Contention index. VLl, VL2, VL3, DGSl, DGS3 are experimental indicators with their 
contention in parenthesis. Interaction effects are denoted by the symbol *· DGSl(per ::; 5) indicates 
the first 5 pefiods of experiment DGSl, in which the subjects had difficulty during the first 5 periods. 
The symbol T indicates a probability level ::; 0.10; these variables will be considered significant in the 
discussions below. 
The estimation indicates: 
1. The period effect is not significant.
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2. vVhen the first ten periods are included, contention is significant with low­
contention consumers' surplus (relative to optimal) being lower than the high­
contention consumer surplus for the same mechanism. When the first ten periods are 
excluded, contention is not significant. 
3. In terms of consumer's surplus we have VL -DGS > 0, but this difference
becomes smaller with time. 
We conclude that when contention is low both of the mechanisms tested will give 
the subjects the same level of consumer surplus. But when contention is high 
consumers' surplus is significantly affected. 
6.S Revenue
In Table 6 we present the revenue generated by the two transfer mechanisms: 
the Vickrey-Leonard sealed-bid auction and the DGS progressive auction. Even though 
revenue is total welfare less consumer surplus, we present this information for two 
reasons. First, the efficiency and consumer surplus measures may be confounding and 
the effect on revenue generation may not be apparent; that is, if one mechanism has 
both lower efficiency and lower consumer surplus than another mechanism, then the 
revenue from one mechanism could be either higher or lower than the revenue from the 
other mechanism. Second, in most auction studies, progressive auctions tend to 
generate more revenue than sealed-bid auctions (see, e.g., Banks et. al (1989)). 
Mechanism\ Experiments 
Low Contention 
Vickrey-Leonard 
DGS Auction 
High Contention 
Vickrey-Leonard 
DGS Auction 
Table 6: Revenue 
(observed vs. predicted)
1 ( o-) 
314 (277) 
613 (367) 
2 ( o-) 
375 (236) 
768(602) 
2821(780) 2658(693) 
3098(731) 3225(727) 
437 (269) 
All (o-) 
375 (254) 
690 (500) 
2739 (731) 
2993 (943) 
Predicted ( o-) 
490 (335) 
490 (335) 
3253(289) 
3253(289) 
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From Table 6 we observe that in both the high-contention and low-contention 
environments ,  the DGS auction generated higher levels of revenue. In the low­
contention environment the DGS auction generated higher than predicted levels of 
revenue and a very high variance in the second experiment. The high variance in the 
second DGS auction appears to be from the first 5 periods, where it appears some 
subjects may have been confused. Nonetheless, the results we find here are consistent 
with the results found in other studies (see, Banks et. al (1 989)). 
6.4 Individual Behavior
In this section, we look at individual behavior to see if the mechanisms are 
robust to individual deviations from predicted behavior and if the behavior assumptions 
we applied were appropriate. 
We do not formally model an individual's "learning" or the events that 
determine a subject's behavior, but only inquire if we can measure the direction of the 
difference in our treatment effects. This means that if we can measure a difference in 
subjects' bids between the first and last periods of an experiment, then we cannot 
announce that we have found learning, but only that there is a difference in bidding. 
Auction Behavior 
Smith (1980) and Coppinger, Smith, and Titus (1980) report the results of experi­
ments in which the Vickrey (second-price) auction was used to allocate a single slot. It 
was found that many subjects played their dominant strategy fairly rapidly, but that 
violations of single-period, dominant strategy behavior were common, especially in the 
"early" trials of an experiment session. Miller and Plott (1985) study an auction for 
multiple homogeneous units in which price is set at the highest rejected bid (a uniform 
price auction). For their parameters (many units on the margin), the uniform-price 
auction is demand-revealing, and they find that after replication, bidders report their 
true valuation. Our experiments attempt to see if this behavior continues when the 
goods to be allocated are heterogeneous. 
We note that unlike previous experiments with uniform price auctions we do not 
restrict our subjects to bids below or equal to their slot valuations. The rationale given 
by some for restricting bids is that overbidding can result m negative profits 
(bankruptcy) and thus lead to a subject "sabotaging" an experiment if there is only a 
small chance that he may obtain positive profits. Not being able to extract payment 
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from the subjects allows them to be indifferent between a payoff of zero and any 
negative amount. vVe had very low priors on this happening so we chose to allowed 
bidding to be in [O, 9999] interval. vVe did not observe "sabotaging" to happen in any of 
our experimental trials. 
Vickrey-Leonard sealed-bid auction 
In the VL auction we hypothesized that subjects would play a weakly dominant 
strategy, and when it existed, their strong dominant strategy. Subjects in the low­
contention environment have a set of weakly dominant bidding strategies; each bid 
differs from the subject's slot valuations by the addition of a constant. In the high­
contention environment, subjects have a unique, strong dominant strategy to bid their 
slot valuations. The lack of a larger set of weak strategies in the high-contention 
environment is the result of eight subjects and only six slots; this creates two implied 
slots that have zero value for all the subjects. For weakly dominant strategies to exist, 
the subjects must be able to place bids on all the slots, but in the high-contention case, 
they are permitted to place bids on only six of the slots. 
In Appendix E we display bidding behavior for each subject and each VL sealed­
bid experiment. Each graph shows three series, which are based on the difference 
between a subject's bid and his slot values. The three series are: 
1) max{bid1 -val1},J 
2) mean{bidi -vali}, andJ 
3) min{bid1 -val1},J 
where bid;_ bid slot j, and val1 =value of slot j.
So high values on the graph indicate overbidding and low values indicate underbidding. 
The plotted variables were truncated so that all graphs were in the range [-1000, 1000]. 
The low-contention experiments were also adjusted by a constant for each period, 
depending on the valuations and bids, since in the low-contention environment subjects 
had many weakly dominant strategies that varied only by a constant. The adjustment 
was accomplished as follows: 
Let bid*1 = bid1-min{bid1}, and let val*i = val1-min{val1}. Then the three seriesJ J 
are: 1). ma,'\:{bid*; -val*i},J 
2) mean{bid*1-val*1}, andJ 
3) min{bid*j-val*1}J 
From these displays we can observe that: 
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1. The high-contention environment has a higher variance of (bid - value) and
more consistent overbidding. Often the overbidding occurs in the earlier periods and 
disappears in latter periods. 
2. The low-contention environment has more consistent underbidding, and rarely
is overbidding observed. 
These results can be explained by the intense competition for slots in the high 
contention case pushing subjects to initially overbid for slots. However, when such 
overbidding resulted in a loss it was rarely repeated. 
Table 7a: Vickrey-Leonard Sealed-bid 
(bid-value summary statistics)* 
High Contention x O' min 
Min (bid-val) -167.1 660.3 -900.0 
Mean (bid-val) 88.5 820.3 -416.6 
Max (bid-val) 652.5 1983.8 -300.0 
Low Contention x O' min 
Min (bid-val) -160.9 174.7 -600.0 
Mean (bid-val) -51.0 93.7 -299.8 
Ma,'{ (bid-val) 57.9 142.4 0 
High Contention (truncated) x O' min 
Min (bid-val) 
Mean (bid-val) 
Max (bid-val) 
* - . al X is the mean v ue, 
-208.5 266.7 -900.0 
2.3 300.0 -416.6 
190.0 382.3 -300.0 
er is the standard deviation, and X is the median. 
max x 
9099 -200 
9649 -50.0 
9999 1 .0 
max x 
0 -100 
241 .7 -16.7 
800 0.0 
max x 
1000 -200 
1000 -50.0 
1000 1.0 
Table 7a shows that for high-contention environments the means and standard 
deviation of the bid- value difference are much larger than for low-contention 
environments. The last part of the table contains the summary statistics for the high­
contention environment when the bid -value observations are truncated above at 1000. 
This was done because a few very high differences above 1000 skew the summary 
statistics except for the median (there were 4 truncations in the minimum observations, 
22 
16 for the mean observations, and 51 for the maximum observations). 
The second measure of subjects' behavior is found by substituting an individual's 
bid with his valuations to determine if there is a gain, and hence if a subject's 
deviations were costing him. If deviations from truthful reporting do not cost the 
subject, then we cannot argue that it is in his best interest to play the dominant 
strategy. The descriptive statistics below indicate that on average the gain for truthful 
revelation was largest in the high-contention environment. 
Experiment 
1 
2 
3 
4 
9 
Table 7b: Vickrey-Leonard Sealed-bid 
(net gain statistics)* 
contention x x 
high 82.4 61.6 
low 30.6 26.0 
high 53.3 37.6 
low 29.2 30.0 
low 16.7 22.3 
* 7:f is the mean of the standard deviations for the subjects.
� 
288.9 
63.9 
1 88.4 
80.9 
84. 9
In addition, an analysis of covariance was performed, wherein subjects were 
considered to be random effects, type (payoff values) were considered to be a fixed 
effect, and time over periods was measured as (1/period) . The following period-effect 
results are presented: 
Variable 
Min (bid-val) 
Mean (bid-val) 
Ma,""\'. (bid-val) 
Table 7c: Vickrey-Leonard Sealed-bid 
(period effect) 
Experiment type 
Low contention High Contention 
-65.2 (0.08) 286 (0.09) 
-32.0 (0.09) 786 (0.00) 
80.0 (0.004) 2010 (0.00) 
High Truncated 
-14.4 (0.002) 
131 .0 (0.028) 
213.0 (0.003) 
23 
A Hausman (1978) x2-test specification test was performed, and the null 
hypothesis of correct specification could not be rejected with probability p = 0.99 on all 
the models except Min (val-bid) for high truncation. 
From the above model we observe: 
1. The period effect is found to be significant m all cases, especially for
Max(bid-val) . 
. 2. In the high-contention treatment, the (bid - value) measurements are higher 
than average in earlier periods (as observed from the positive coefficient). 
3. In the low-contention treatment, Min(bid-val) and Max(bid-val) are lower
than average in the earlier periods. This would indicate that subjects underbid more on 
their least favorable slots in the earlier periods. 
DGS Progressive Auction 
To study individual behavior in the DGS progressive auction experiments we 
construct three measures of bidding behavior. In the description of the DGS 
experiments, Bi(P) � K refers to set of slots selected by subject i given the vector of
prices p over the slots. Bi(P) is subject i's bid and subject i bids on slot j if j E B;(p). 
Net value is the subject's value for a slot minus the price for that slot (vi;- P;)· We
now make the following categories of bid types in the DGS auction. 
1. A bid B ;(p) is revealing if h E B ;(p) then v ih - p h ::'.". 0 and if h * = argmax
v;; - P; then h* E B;(p ). That is, at least one of the bids is on a slot that m<L--<imiz�i �(et
value, and there are no bids on slots that have negative net value. A bid may be placed 
on a nonmaximizing slot, and there may be maximizing slots that do not receive a bid 
(if there is more than one maximizing slot) .  
2 . A bid B;(p) is  positive nonrevealing if h E B;(p) then vih - Ph::'.". 0 and if
h* = argmax V; - P; then h* r/:: B;(p). That is, there are no bids on slots that maximize 
net vaf u"e Kand there are no bids on slots that have negative net value. If there are slots
that have positive net value, there is at least one bid. 
3. A bid Bi(P) is negative nonrevealing if 3h EB ;(p) such that vih - Ph< 0 or
B;(p) = 0 when 3h E K such that vih - Ph ::'.". 0. That is, there is a bid on a slot that has
negative net value, or there are no bids when there is a slot with positive net value. 
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These categories are mutually exclusive and exhaustive; that is, a bid falls in one 
and only one of the three categories. The following table presents summary statistics of 
these measures for the four DGS auction experiments. 
Table 8: DGS 
Var iable Contention N Mean Std Dev 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Reveal low 40 0 . 9297 0 . 0766 
h igh 40 0 . 8604 0 . 08 1 3  
Pos i tive low 40 0 . 0447 0 . 05 1 9  
nonrev h igh 40 0 . 1037 0 . 0553 
Negative l ow 40 0 . 0256 0 . 0586 
nonrev h igh 40 0 . 0359 0 . 0492 
In table 8 we observe that there is a high percentage of revealing bids for both 
the low- and high-contention treatments, and that there is a low percentage of negative 
nonrevealing bids for both the low- and high-contention treatments. In Appendix F we 
present graphs by contention for these three measures. From these graphs we observe 
that in the low-contention treatment there is a tendency for more revelation in the later 
periods, and that in the high-contention treatment there is a tendency for less revelation 
in the later periods. We conjecture that this is due to the different number of iterations 
necessary to complete an allocation (an average 7.5 in the low-contention treatment and 
21 in the high-contention treatment) .  In the high-contention treatment some subjects 
tended to place a "quick" bid in the the early iterations; they were not as careful in 
their bidding when the likelihood that the period would end was low. 
There is a noticeable spike at period 15 in the high-contention treatment, which 
occurs in both of the high-contention experiments. These spikes can be explained by 
observing the individual behavior. After period 10 in the high-contention experiments 
subjects began to sit out of the early iterations of a period. In most of the periods there 
was considerable contention for slots, and a lot of bidding in the early iterations, so that 
waiting did not. affect. the outcome. In period 15 .. there .is .. relatively less contention, and 
when two subjects sat out, there was an immediate (after 2 iterations) allocation 
omitting the subjects who sat out. In subsequent periods the subjects no longer sat out 
the early iterations. 
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7. Concluding Remarks
In this paper the allocation problem of assigning (or matching) a set of slots to a 
set of agents is considered. Two auction processes were tested (sealed-bid and 
progressive auctions) in two different environments (low and high contention) . As in 
single-object auctions, the progressive auction generated higher revenues and higher 
efficiencies than the sealed-bid auction, though the efficiency difference was not 
significant. The net effect is that the small gain in efficiency from using a progressive 
auction instead of its sealed-bid counterpart is at the expense of consumers' surplus. An 
examination of the individual subject data in the sealed-bid auction revealed that 
subjects tended to overbid in the high-contention environment, especially in the early 
periods, but that in the low-contention environment, underbidding was more prevalent. 
In the progressive auction subjects tended to bid "honestly,'' and deviations from honest 
behavior had little effect on the outcome. 
In general, subjects tended to behave differently in the high and low contention 
environments. There was more variance m behavior in the earlier periods and less 
variance in the later periods particularly in the high-contention environment. This 
behavioral difference was due to the amount of competition in the high-contention 
environment and the higher likelihood that a nonrevealing strategy would result in lost 
profits. 
The main ingredient that is used by the auctions examined in this paper to 
overcome the incentive problem confronted in the assignment problem is the use of 
money transfers from agents to the planner. This of course begs the question of what 
the planner should do with the transfer; this is a different game than the one analyzed 
here. In addition, the use of money transfers reduces consumers' surplus in the high 
contention environments where these auctions produce relatively high efficiencies. The 
natural question to ask is whether these mechanism can be extended to the case where 
money transfer cannot be used or that all revenue generate by the auction is "rebated" 
back to the participants. This is the avenue of our current research efforts. 
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Appendix A. 
LOW-CONTENTION PAYOFF LIST 
Unit Number 
Set o f
Values 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 8 0 0 6 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 0  4 0 0 6 0 0  
2 4 0 0 6 0 0  8 0 0  6 0 0  4 0 0 2 0 0  
3 4 0 0 2 0 0  4 0 0 6 0 0  8 0 0  6 0 0  
4 8 5 0  3 5 0  3 5 0  8 5 0 3 5 0  3 5 0  
5 7 5.0 4 0 0 4 0 0 7 5 0  4 0 0  4 0 0
6 9 0 0  3 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0
7 3 0 0  3 0 0 9 0 0  3 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0
8 5 0 0  5 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 0  5 0 0  
9 5 5 0  5 5 0  5 5 0  5 5 0  5 5 0  5 5 0  
1 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 9 0 0  
HIGH-CONTENTION PAYOFF LIST 
Unit Number 
Set o f
Values 1 2 3 4 � 6_, 
1 9 0 0 4 5 0  4 0 0 3 5 0  3 0 0 2 5 0  
2 4 0 0 6 0 0  8 0 0 6 0 0  4 0 0 2 0 0
3 8 0 0  6 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 0  4 0 0  6 0 0  
4 1 0 0 1 0 0 9 0 0  4 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0  
5 4 0 0 8 0 0  4 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0  
6 9 0 0 6 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0  1 0 0  0 
7 3 0 0  3 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0  9 0 0  
8 7 5 0  2 5 0  2 5 0  7 5 0  4 0 0 4 0 0
9 4 0 0  2 0 0  4 0 0 6 0 0  8 0 0  6 0 0  
1 0  8 5 0  3 5 0  3 5 0  6 5 0  1 5 0  1 5 0  
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Realized Payoff Lists 
The next pages contain the realized payof f  l ists the used in 
the experiments . Each list ( one for high and low contention) 
contains a matrix o f  numbers for each period . These matrices 
contain the potential slot values for each subj ect . Each row 
indicates a subject and each column indicates a slot . There are 
8 rows ( 8  subj ect s )  for the high contention list,  and 6 rows ( 6  
subj ects for the low contention list.  Each matrix contains 6 
columns ( 6  s l ot s )  for both the low and high contention l ists . 
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Low-Contention Payoff 
Lists 
period 1 period 6 period 1 1  
400 600 800 600 400 200 500 500 500 500 500 500 850 350 350 850 350 350 
800 600 400 200 400 600 500 500 500 500 500 500 750 400 400 750 400 400 
400 200 400 600 800 600 750 400 400 750 400 400 850 350 350 850 350 350 
400 600 800 600 400 200 850 350 350 850 350 350 750 400 400 750 400 400 
550 550 550 550 550 550 850 350 350 850 350 350 500 500 500 500 500 500 
400 600 800 600 400 200 750 400 400 750 400 400 550 550 550 550 550 550 
period 2 period 7 period 1 2  
900 300 300 300 300 300 900 300 300 300 300 300 550 550 550 550 550 550 
900 300 300 300 300 300 550 550 550 550 550 550 400 600 800 600 400 200 
400 600 800 600 400 200 400 600 800 600 400 200 750 400 400 750 400 400 
800 600 400 200 400 600 750 400 400 750 400 400 500 500 500 500 500 500 
300 300 900 300 300 300 900 300 300 300 300 300 500 500 500 500 500 500 
800 600 400 200 400 600 900 300 300 300 300 300 800 600 400 200 400 600 
period 3 period 8 period 1 3  
500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
800 600 400 200 400 600 800 600 400 200 400 600 550 550 550 550 550 550 
300 300 300 300 300 900 850 350 350 850 350 350 850 350 350 850 350 350 
300 300 300 300 300 900 800 600 400 200 400 600 900 300 300 300 300 300 
300 300 300 300 300 900 750 400 400 750 400 400 400 200 400 600 800 600 
750 400 400 750 400 400 800 600 400 200 400 600 900 300 300 300 300 300 
period 4 period 9 period 1 4  
75 0  400 400 750 400 400 300 300 900 300 300 300 900 300 300 300 300 300 
400 200 400 600 800 600 550 550 550 550 550 550 400 600 800 600 400 200 
900 300 300 300 300 300 400 200 400 600 800 600 800 600 400 200 400 600 
500 500 500 500 500 500 850 350 350 850 350 350 300 300 900 300 300 300 
550 550 550 550 550 550 900 300 300 300 300 300 800 600 400 200 400 600 
750 400 400 750 400 400 500 500 500 500 500 500 400 200 400 600 800 600 
period 5 period 1 0  per i od  1 5  
400 200 400 600 800 600 850 350 350 850 350 350 550 550 550 550 550 550 
900 300 300 300 300 300 800 600 400 200 400 600 400 600 800 600 400 200 
750 400 400 750 400 400 400 600 800 600 400 200 750 400 400 750 400 400 
750 400 400 750 400 400 550 550 550 550 550 550 800 600 400 200 400 600 
800 600 400 200 400 600 800 600 400 200 400 600 850 350 350 850 350 350 
850 350 350 850 350 350 900 300 300 300 300 300 900 300 300 300 300 300 
Low-Contention cont. 
period 16 
800 600 400 200 400 600 
500 500 500 500 500 500 
850 350 350 850 350 350 
800 600 400 200 400 600 
750 400 400 750 400 400 
800 600 400 .. 200 400 600 
peri od  1 7  
850 350 350 850 350 350 
300 300 900 300 300 300 
550 550 550 550 550 550 
400 200 400 600 800 600 
900 300 300 300 300 300 
500 500 500 500 500 500 
period 18 
900 300 300 300 300 300 
850 350 350 850 350 350 
800 600 400 200 400 600 
400 600 800 600 400 200 
550 550 550 550 550 550 
800 600 400 200 400 600 
period 1 9  
750 400 400 750 400 400 
850 350 350 850 350 350 
750 400 400 750 400 400 
850 350 350 850 350 350 
750 400 400 750 400 400 
550 550 550 550 550 550 
period 20 
400 600 800 600 400 200 
550 550 550 550 550 550 
750 400 400 750 400 400 
500 500 500 500 500 500 
500 500 500 500 500 500 
800 600 400 200 400 600 
A-4 
period 1 
400 600 800 600 400 200 
800 600 400 200 400 600 
400 200 400 600 800 600 
400 600 800 600 400 200 
400 800 400 200 0 200 
400 600 800 600 400 200 
100 100 900 400 300 200 
900 600 300 200 100 0 
period 2 
900 450 400 350 300 250 
900 450 400 350 300 250 
400 600 800 600 400 200 
800 600 400 200 400 600 
100 100 900 400 300 200 
800 600 400 200 400 600 
400 800 400 200 0 200 
400 800 400 200 0 200 
period 3 
900 600 300 200 100 0 
800 600 400 200 400 600 
300 300 300 300 300 900 
300 300 300 300 300 900 
300 300 300 300 300 900 
750 250 250 750 400 400 
900 600 300 200 100 0 
100 100 900 400 300 200 
period 4 
750 250 250 750 400 400 
400 200 400 600 800 600 
900 450 400 350 300 250 
900 600 300 200 100 0 
400 800 400 200 0 200 
750 250 250 750 400 400 
900 450 400 350 300 250 
750 250 250 750 400 400 
period 5 
400 200 400 600 800 600 
900 450 400 350 300 250 
750 250 250 750 400 400 
750 250 250 750 400 400 
800 600 400 200 400 600 
850 350 350 650 150 150 
850 350 350 650 150 150 
400 200 400 600 800 600 
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High-Contention Payoff 
Lists 
period 6 period 1 1  
900 600 300 200 100 0 850 350 350 650 150 150 
900 600 300 200 100 0 750 250 250 750 400 400 
750 250 250 750 400 400 850 350 350 650 150 150 
850 350 350 650 150 150 750 250 250 750 400 400 
850 350 350 650 150 150 900 600 300 200 100 0 
750 250 250 750 400 400 400 800 400 200 0 200 
400 600 800 600 400 200 400 800 400 200 0 200 
800 600 400 200 400 600 850 350 350 650 150 150 
period 7 period 1 2  
900 450 400 350 300 250 400 800 400 200 0 200 
400 800 400 200 0 200 400 600 800 600 400 200 
400 600 800 600 400 200 750 250 250 750 400 400 
750 250 250 750 400 400 900 600 300 200 100 0 
900 450 400 350 300 250 900 600 300 200 100 0 
900 450 400 350 300 250 800 600 400 200 400 600 
800 600 400 200 400 600 850 350 350 650 150 150 
850 350 350 650 150 150 400 800 400 200 0 200 
period 8 period 1 3  
900 600 300 200 100 0 900 600 300 200 100 0 
800 600 400 200 400 600 400 800 400 200 0 200 
850 350 350 650 150 150 850 350 350 650 150 150 
800 600 400 200 400 600 900 450 400 350 300 250 
750 250 250 750 400 400 400 200 400 600 800 600 
800 600 400 200 400 600 900 450 400 350 300 250 
900 450 400 350 300 250 400 200 400 600 800 600 
400 600 800 600 400 200 850 350 350 650 150 150 
period 9 period 1 4  
100 1 0 0  900 400 300 200 900 450 400 350 300 250 
400 800 400 200 0 200 400 600 800 600 400 200 
400 200 400 600 800 600 800 600 400 200 400 600 
850 350 350 650 150 150 100 100 900 400 300 200 
900 450 400 350 300 250 800 600 400 200 400 600 
900 600 300 200 100 0 400 200 400 600 800 600 
750 250 250 750 400 400 400 600 800 600 400 200 
900 600 300 200 100 0 900 600 300 200 100 0 
' ' ,period 1 0  period 1 5  
850 350 350 650 150 150 400 800 400 200 0 200 
800 600 400 200 400 600 400 600 800 600 400 200 
400 600 800 600 400 200 750 250 250 750 400 400 
400 800 400 200 0 200 800 600 400 200 400 600 
800 600 400 200 400 600 850 350 350 650 150 150 
900 450 400 350 300 250 900 450 400 350 300 250 
400 200 400 600 800 600 750 250 250 750 400 400 
100 100 900 400 300 200 750 250 250 750 400 400 
H i gh·Contention cont. 
period 1 6  
400 800 400 200 0 200 
400 600 800 600 400 200 
100 100 900 400 300 200 
900 600 300 200 100 o 
400 600 800 600 400 200 
800 600 400 200 400 600 
400 200 ,400 ,600 800 ,600 
400 600 800 600 400 200 
period 1 7  
100 100 900 400 300 200 
800 600 400 200 400 600 
400 800 400 200 o 200 
400 800 400 200 o 200 
900 450 400 350 300 250 
900 450 400 350 300 250 
400 600 800 600 400 200 
800 600 400 200 400 600 
period 1 8  
300 300 300 300 300 900 
750 250 250 750 400 400 
900 600 300 200 100 o 
100 100 900 400 300 200 
900 600 300 200 100 0 
800 600 400 200 400 600 
300 300 300 300 300 900 
300 300 300 300 300 900 
period 1 9  
400 800 400 200 0 200 
750 250 250 750 400 400 
900 450 400 350 300 250 
750 250 250 750 400 400 
750 250 250 750 400 400 
400 200 400 600 800 600 
900 450 400 350 300 250 
900 600 300 200 100 0 
period 20 
800 600 400 200 400 600 
850 350 350 650 150 150 
850 350 350 650 150 150 
400 200 400 600 800 600 
400 200 400 600 800 600 
900 450 400 350 300 250 
750 250 250 750 400 400 
750 250 250 750 400 400 
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Appendix B .  
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 
You are about to participate in an experiment in which you 
,, 
will make decis ions in a market . Your profits from the 
experiment will be in terms of francs . You can convert your 
franc earnings into U . S .  dollars at a conversion rate of 6 0 0  
francs to l U . S .  dollar . Any profits you make in the experiment 
are yours to keep . You will b e  paid at the end o f  the 
experiment . 
The experiment will be divided up into a series of 
"periods . "  At the beginning of each period you will be given 
redemption values on your terminal screen . The redemption values 
are the franc values to you of six different items . Your 
redemption values are known only to you , and you should not 
reveal them to any other participants . Your profit each period 
is equal to the redemption value of the unit you receive minus 
the price for the unit . For examp l e ,  suppose the redemption 
value for the unit you bought is 7 0 0  francs and its price is 4 0 0 .  
Then your profit for that period is 3 0 0 francs . 
In our market you will be one o f  __a participants to be
assigned units . There will be s ix units , which will be numbered 
from one to six,  allocated simultaneously each period . These 
units are not the same ; that is , they do not necessarily have 
the same redemption values to a participant . They will be 
allocated through a procedure that will be described later. 
In Tab l e  1 you will find the ten possible sets of redemption
values . The table l ists the number of the unit and the 
corresponding value . The sheet has eleven rows . The first row , 
labeled unit , indicates the number of the unit being allocated 
( in the experiment there will be six units assigned , which will 
be referred to as units 1 , 2 ,  . . .  , 6 ) . The second through the
eleventh row give the possible participants ' redemption values . 
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For the first set of redemption values , unit 1 is worth qoo 
francs to the participant, whereas unit 4 is worth 3 �0 .  
Each participant in the experiment is given one of the ten 
' 
possible sets of redemption values at the beginning of each 
period . The sets of redemption values other participants happen 
to receive do not affect the redemption values you receive . 
TABLE l. .  
Unit Number 
Set of 
Values 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 9 0 0  4 5 0  4 0 0  3 5 0  3 0 0  2 5 0  
2 4 0 0  6 0 0  8 0 0  6 0 0  4 0 0  2 0 0  
3 8 0 0  6 0 0  4 0 0  2 0 0  4 0 0  6 0 0  
4 1 0 0  1 0 0  9 0 0  4 0 0  3 0 0 2 0 0  
5 4 0 0  8 0 0  4 0 0  2 0 0  0 2 0 0  
6 9 0 0  6 0 0  3 0 0  2 0 0  1 0 0  0 
7 3 0 0  3 0 0  3 0 0  3 0 0  3 0 0  9 0 0  
8 7 5 0  2 5 0  2 5 0  7 5 0  4 0 0  4 0 0  
9 4 0 0  2 0 0  4 0 0  6 0 0  8 0 0  6 0 0  
. .  
1 0  8 5 0  3 5 0  3 5 0  6 5 0  150 150 
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THE ALLOCATION PROCESS 
Each period you will see a display on your terminal l ike the 
one shown below . The top row gives the number o f  the unit to be 
allocated . The third row, labeled value , gives your 'redemption 
values for that period . The second row ' indicates your bids on 
the corresponding units . You 
selecting the correct box and 
may enter 
typing in 
a bid on the unit by 
your b i d .  You must enter 
a b id that is·  ·greater''than or equal· to z·ero for each unit . In 
the following figure , the buyer has bid o for unit 1 ,  5 0 0  for
unit 2 ,  and 6 0 0  for unit 3 .
Unit 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Bid 0 5 0 0  6 0 0  199 2 0 5  2 2
Value 8 0 0  6 0 0  4 0 0  2 0 0  400  600  
Once you have entered a l l  o f  your bids and pressed the END 
key , you will be asked to confirm them . After checking them and 
making sure they are the bids you want , press the Y key to send 
the bids . A market program determines the recipient of each 
uni t .  By this procedure you can receive at most one uni t .  and 
all six units will be assigned . 
The Allocation : 
0 once the bids are received from all the participants , the 
six units are allocated by the fol lowing method . It finds the 
combination o f  .'!assignments" for which. the total of the winning 
bids for all six units is the greatest . That is , it gives units 
to buyers ( recall , however , that one buyer can get at most one 
unit) so that the total of the b ids of the buyers on the units 
they actually receive is the highest possib l e .  An example with 
three participants and three units is given below ( example 1 )  .
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Exampl e  1 : Three Buyers and Three Units 
Units and Bids ' 
Buyer 1 2 3 
1 8 0 0  7 0 0  2 0 0  
2 7 0 0  5 0 0  4 0 0  
3 4 0 0  4 0 0  4 0 0  
2 0 0  
Here , buyer 
for unit 3 .  
1 has bid 8 0 0  for . unit 1 ,  7 0 0  for unit 2 ,  and 
Buyer 2 has b id 7 0 0  for unit 1 ,  5 0 0  for unit 2 ,
and 4 0 0  for unit 3 .  Buyer 3 has bid 4 0 0  for each unit . 
The allocation is : 
Buyer 1 receives unit 2 .  
Buyer 2 receives unit 1 .  
Buyer 3 receives unit 3 .
The total of the winning bids from this assignment is 1 8 0 0 , 
and the total of winning bids from any other assignment is less 
than 1 8 0 0 . Notice from the e·xampl e ,  that the buyer who bids the 
most on a unit does not necessarily receive that unit . I f  two or 
more assignments yield the same maximum total , the ass ignment is 
chosen randomly . 
Prices 
In addition to allucating the slots , the market program 
computes a price for each slot . They are calculated as follows : 
2 )  After the allocation is made , the program calculates the 
total o f  the b ids o f  the buyers on those units that they are 
allocated . 
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3 )  The following total is calculated for unit 1 .  The 
program supposes that there was an extra unit 1 available and 
therefore a total of seven units to be sold . It then finds the 
combination o f  assignments for which the total amount b id for 
units received is the greatest possible ( as in step 1 ) . The 
total of the b ids of the buyers on the units they would receive 
is calculated (as in step 2 ) . Notice this is always greater than 
or equal · to  the amount ·in step 2 •"because there are more 
combinations availab l e ,  and all of the combinations previously 
available are still available . 
4 )  The difference between the two-bid total is calculated .
This difference is the price charged for unit one . 
5 )  Steps 3 and 4 are repeated for units 2 - 6 . The example 
below works out the process for a case when there are two units 
to be sol.d and two buyers . 
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Example 2 :
Units and B ids 
Buyer 1 2 
1 1 0 0 0  6 0 0  
2 8 0 0  1 0 0  
The combination o f  ass ignments where the total amount bid on 
the units is the greatest possible is the following : Buyer 1 
receives unit 2 and buyer 2 receives unit 1 .  The total amount
bid is 6 0 0  + 8 0 0  = 1 4 0 0 . I f  there were another unit 1 available,  
however , each buyer would receive a unit 1 ,  and the total amount 
bid would be 100 + 8 0 0  = 18 0 0 . Therefore , the price charged for 
one unit is 1 8 0 0  - 1 4 0 0  = 4 0 0 . I f  there was another unit 2 
available ,  the allocation would be unchanged . Therefore , the 
price of unit 2 is zero .
After this process is completed, the terminal will indicate 
the unit you received . The redemption value of the unit you 
receive is your profit for the period. I f  you do not receive a 
unit , your profit is z ero for the period . 
You can press the H key at any time to see the history 
screen . The screen shows your redemption values for each unit 
during the past periods in the rows labelled values , and the bids 
you submitted on each unit during the past periods in the rows 
labelled bid . The units which you have already received and the 
payoffs you have earned are in the rows labelled payoffs , which 
are highlighted . 
This concludes the instruction for the experiment . I f  you 
have any questions , please raise your hand and a monitor will 
answer your questions . We will have a practice period to help 
famil iarize you with the experiment . 
Appendix c :  Graphical displays o f  efficiencies and consumer 
surplus . 
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Appendix D :  Estimation o f  experimental e ffects . 
Val i d  cases : 
Total SS : 
R- squared : 
Res i dual SS:  
Var 
SURE RESULTS : A l l  periods - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - -
Log of L i k e l i hood fun c t i o n  = 144 . 5338 
Coef 
Equation 1 
Dependent variab l e : EFF 
180 
0 . 84£8 
0 . 4398 
0 . 4744 
�li ss i ng case s : 
Degrees of freedom : 
Rbar-squared : 
Std error of e s t :  
Std . Error t-Stat P - Va l u e  
0 
165 
0 . 4429 
0 . 0513 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Constant 0 . 98-50 0 . 0147 67 . 1 1 69 0 . 0000 
Pl -0 . 0803 0 . 0278 -2 . 8875 0 . 0044 
Conten t i on 0 . 0290 0 . 0581 0 . 4995 0 . 6180 
DGS - 0 . 0130 0 . 0 1 76 -0 . 7370 0 . 4621 
DGS*Pl 0 . 0829 0 . 0374 2 .  2 1 .so 0 . 0280 
COl 0 . 0236 0 . 0665 0 . 35.52 0 . 7229 
P 1 *C01 -0 . 0054 0 . 0378 -0 . 1 4 1 8  0 . 8874 
Cont*COl -0 . 0720 0 . 0993 -0 . 7256 0 . 4690 
DGS*COl 0 . 0245 0 . 0230 1 . 0686 0 . 2867 
VLl ( h igh ) - 0 . 01 19 0 . 01 6 2  -0 . 73 1 6  0 . 46-54 
VL2 ( l o w )  -0 . 0018 0 . 0 1 62 - 0 . 1099 0 . 9126 
VL3 ( h igh ) -0 . 0046 0 . 0 162 - 0 . 2840 0 . 7768 
DGS l ( l o w )  0 . 0098 0 . 01 78 0 . 5514 0 . 5821 
DGS3 ( h igh ) 0 . 00 1 1  0 . 0 162 0 . 0651 0 . 9482 
DGSl ( per :S .s ) - 0 .  268-5 0 . 0297 - 9 . 0463 0 . 0000 
Va l i d  cases : 
Total SS : 
R- squared : 
Res i dual SS : 
Var Coef 
Equation 2 
Dependent var iab l e :  CS 
180 M i s s i ng cases : 
60 . 4543 Degrees of freedom : 
0 . 1912 Rbar- squared : 
48 . 8926 Std error of e s t :  
Std . Error t-Stat P-Val u e  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Constant 0 . 96 1 2  0 . 1490 6 . 45 1 6  0 . 0000 
P l  -0 . 05 14 0 . 2823 - 0 . 1822 0 . 8556 
Contention 0 . 33 1 9  0 . 5902 0 . .  5623 0 . 5746 
DGS -0 . 0859 0 . 1784 -0 . 48 1 7  0 . 6306 
DGS*Pl -0 . 1244 0 . 3801 -0 . 3274 0 . 7438 
COl - 1 .  2655 0 . 6753 - 1 . 8741 0 . 0625 
P 1 *C01 0 . 1285 0 . 3837 0 . 3348 0 . 7382 
Cont*COl 2 . 0964 1 .  0081 2 . 0796 0 . 0390 
DGS*COl -0 . 5123 0 . 2331 -2 . 1981 0 . 0292 
VL l ( h i gh )  -0 .  251.5 0 . 1648 - 1  . . 5251 0 . 1288 
\'L2( low) 0 . 0352 0 .  1648 0 . 2 1 36 0 .  83.1 1 
\'L3 ( h i gh ) 0 . 0085 0 . 1648 0 .  o.5 1 7  0 . 9589 
DGS l ( low) 0 . 0265 0 . 1 8 1 2  0 . 1462 0 . 8840 
DGS3 ( h i g h )  0 . 1356 0 . 1648 0 . 8229 0 . 41 1 6  
DGS l ( per � 5 )  - 0 . 1669 0 . 30 1 3  -0 . . 5,539 0 . 5803 
0 
165 
0 . 1957 
0 . 52 1 2  
Val i d  cases : 
Total SS : 
R-squared : 
Res idual , SS :  
Var 
SURE RESULTS : Last ten periods - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Log o f  L i kel ihood function = 1 1 0 . 8225 
Coef 
Equat i on 1 
Dependent var i abl e :  EFF 
90 
0 . 1219 
0 . 0953 
0 . 1103 
ll i s s i ng cases : 
Degrees of freedom: 
Rbar- squared : 
Std''error of e s t :  
Std . Error t-Stat P-Yal u e  
0 
76 
0 . 1054 
0 . 0350 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Constant 0 . 9683 0 . 03 1 9  3 0 . 3 1 64 0 . 0000 
P l  0 . 0920 0 . 4523 0 . 2034 0. 8393
Contention 0 . 0222 0 . 0539 0 . 4127 0 . 6808 
DGS 0 . 0275 0 . 0417 0 . 6,594 0 . 5 1 1 3  
DGSPl - 0 . 38 1 3  0 . 5TT5 - 0 . 6603 0 . 5 108 
COl 0 . 0046 0 .  073,5 0 . 0623 0 . 9505 
PhCOl - 0 . 3024 0 . 5826 - 0 . ,5190 0 .  60.50 
Con*COl 0 . 0079 0 . 0921 0 .  08-57 0 . 93 1 9  
DGS*COl 0 . 0 1 08 0 . 0221 0 . 4886 0 . 6263 
YLl -0 . 0224 0 . 0157 - 1 . 4296 0 . 1563 
YL2 -0 . 0 1 72 0 . 0157 - 1 . 0958 0 . 2761 
YL3 0 . 0014 0 . 0 1 57 0 . 0874 0 . 9306 
DGSl 0 . 0008 0 . 0 1 57 0 . 0520 0 . 9586 
DGS3 -0 . 0 1 87 0 .  01-57 - 1 . 1934 0 . 2359 
Val i d  cases : 
Total SS : 
R- squared : 
Resi dual SS : 
Var Coef 
Equat i on 2 
Dependent var iabl e :  CS 
90 
27 . 3210 
0 . 2074 
2 1 . 6543 
M i s s ing cases : 
Degrees of freedom: 
Rbar-squared : 
Std error of e s t :  
·Std . Error t-Stat P-Va l ue 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Constant 0 . 8398 0 . 4476 1 . 8764 0 . 0638 
Pl 1 . 5531 6 . 3376 0 . 245 1 0 . 8070 
Contention 0 . 4139 0 . 7546 0 . 5485 0 . 5847 
DGS 0 . 3290 0 . 5840 0 . 5634 0 . 5746 
DGS*Pl -6 . 1225 8 . 0925 -0 . 7566 0 . 45 1 3  
ConhCOl -0 . 9757 1 . 0305 -0 . 9468 0 : 3462 
P 1 *C01 -0 . 5533 8 . 1643 -0 . 0678 0 . 9461 
ConhCOl 1 . 8228 1 . 2902 1 . 41 28 0 . 1 6 1 2  
DGS*COl -0 . 48 1 0  0 . 3 1 02 - 1 . .5504 0 . 1246 
VLl -0 . 5455 0 . 2 1 94 -2 . 4869 0 . 0147 
VL2 0 . 0417 0 . 2 1 94 0 .  1 9 0 1  0 . 8497 
VL3 0 . 0233 0 . 2 1 94 0 . 1 063 0 .  91-56 
DGSl 0 . 0284 0 . 2194 0 . 1294 0 . 8973 
DGS3 0 . 1420 0 . 2 1 94 0 . 6472 0 . .5192 
0 
76 
0 . 2162 
0 . 4905 
Appendix E :  Graphical displays of Bid - Value . 
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Appendix F :  Graphical displays o f  DGS bidding types . 
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